191st Rifle Division
Active1941–1945
Country Soviet Union
BranchRed Army
TypeDivision
RoleInfantry
EngagementsLeningrad strategic defensive
Siege of Leningrad
Tikhvin offensive
Battle of Lyuban
Leningrad–Novgorod offensive
Baltic offensive
Tartu offensive
Riga offensive (1944)
East Prussian offensive
East Pomeranian offensive
Battle of Berlin
DecorationsOrder of the Red Banner Order of the Red Banner
Battle honoursNovgorod
Commanders
Notable
commanders		Col. Dmitry Lukyanov
Maj. Gen. Timofei Vasilevich Lebedev
Col. Nikolai Petrovich Korkin
Lt. Col. Nikolai Ivanovich Artemenko
Col. Pavel Andreevich Potapov
Maj. Gen. Ivan Nikolaevich Burakovskii
Maj. Gen. Grigorii Osipovich Lyaskin

The 191st Rifle Division was an infantry division of the Red Army, originally formed as part of the prewar buildup of forces, based on the shtat (table of organization and equipment) of September 13, 1939. It began forming just months before the German invasion at Leningrad. At the outbreak of the war it was still not complete and was briefly held in reserve before being sent south to take up positions as part of the Luga Operational Group. After defending along the Kingisepp axis it was forced to withdraw in late August as part of 8th Army, and helped to establish the Oranienbaum Bridgehead. In October it was ferried into Leningrad itself, but was soon airlifted to 4th Army, which was defending against a German drive on Tikhvin. Although the town fell in November, within a week a counterstroke was begun against the vastly overextended German force, which was forced to evacuate on December 8. As it pursued to the Volkhov River the 191st was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, one of the first divisions so honored during the war. During the Lyuban Offensive it penetrated deep into the German lines as part of 2nd Shock Army, but was cut off, and only fragments of the division emerged from the encirclement.

Formation

The division began forming on April 5, 1941, as part of the prewar buildup of Soviet forces, at Leningrad in the Leningrad Military District. Its order of battle on June 22 was as follows, although it changed in several respects during the war:

  • 546th Rifle Regiment
  • 552nd Rifle Regiment
  • 559th Rifle Regiment
  • 484th Light Artillery Regiment (later 1081st Artillery Regiment)
  • 504th Howitzer Artillery Regiment (until October 16, 1941)[1]
  • 8th Antitank Battalion
  • 253rd Reconnaissance Battalion (later 253rd Reconnaissance Company)
  • 330th Sapper Battalion
  • 554th Signal Battalion (later 54th Signal Company)
  • 15th Medical/Sanitation Battalion
  • 176th Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Company
  • 237th Motor Transport Company (later 293rd Motor Transport Battalion)
  • 82nd Field Bakery (later 343rd Motorized Field Bakery, 268th Field Bakery)
  • 152nd Divisional Veterinary Hospital (later 491st)
  • 72417th Field Postal Station (later 726th, 29165th)
  • 556th Field Office of the State Bank

Col. Dmitry Lukyanov took command the day the division started forming. This officer had served as a regimental commander in the 45th Rifle Division during the Winter War, being awarded the Order of the Red Banner, and later rose to the position of the division's deputy commander.

Defense of Leningrad

At the outbreak of war with Germany the 191st was in the reserves of Leningrad Military District (redesignated as Northern Front on June 24), along with the 177th Rifle Division, 8th Rifle Brigade, and several fortified regions.[2] The division was still in the process of being completed at this time.[3] The District commander, Lt. Gen. M. M. Popov, had prepared a defense plan on May 25 which proposed the formation of five "covering regions", each manned by the forces of its own Army. Under this plan, as originally formulated, the 191st and 177th, plus the 70th Rifle Division and most of 1st Mechanized Corps, were retained as Popov's reserve, although these additional forces had been reassigned by the outbreak of the war.[4]

After its breakneck advance through the Baltic states, Army Group North began moving again early on July 9 from the Pskov and Ostrov regions. It was now 250km from Leningrad. In anticipation, on July 4 Army Gen. G. K. Zhukov ordered Popov to "immediately occupy a defense line along the Narva–Luga–Staraya Russa–Borovichi front." Popov officially formed the Luga Operational Group on July 6,[5] and as of July 10 it consisted of the 191st and 177th Divisions as well as the 1st Narodnoe Opolcheniye Division and four machine gun-artillery battalions.[6]

By July 14 the Group had been considerably reinforced with the 41st Rifle Corps, 1st Mountain Rifle Brigade, two more Opolcheniye divisions, and other forces. Popov also placed the two tank divisions of 10th Mechanized Corps in Front reserve to provide armor support. The construction of the actual defense line had begun on June 29, using construction workers and civilians from Leningrad, although when the 177th Division arrived south of Luga itself on July 4 it was so incomplete that an additional 25,000 labourers had to mobilized. The 191st occupied the Kingisepp sector of the line. Meanwhile, the German advance from Pskov, while slower than through the Baltics due to rugged terrain and summer heat, was still gaining some 25km per day. The XXXXI Panzer Corps advanced on Kingisepp, and on July 13 a combat group of 6th Panzer Division captured a small bridgehead over the Luga River. After securing additional footholds southeast of Kingisepp the panzers' advance was stalled for six days by fanatical Soviet resistance.[7]

In response to a letter from the STAVKA dated July 15, Popov split the Luga Group into three separate and semi-independent sector commands on July 23. The Kingisepp Sector, under command of Maj. Gen. V. V. Semashko, consisted of the 191st and 90th Rifle Divisions, two Opolcheniye divisions, and several other assets. On the same day, Hitler reiterated his goal of taking Leningrad before marching on Moscow. Beginning on August 8, the Northern Group of Army Group North was to attack from the Poreche and Sabsk bridgeheads over the Luga, through Kingisepp toward Leningrad. On August 11, after three days of heavy fighting which cost the attackers 1,600 casualties, the XXXXI Panzers and XXXVIII Army Corps were able to penetrate the defenses of 90th Rifle and 2nd Opolcheniye Divisions along the Luga at Kingisepp, Ivanovskoe, and Bolshoi Sabsk. The 8th Panzer Division was now committed, which cut the Kingisepp–Krasnogvardeisk rail line the next day. Kingisepp itself fell on August 16. Most of the defenders fell back to the Krasnogvardeisk Fortified Region, but by now the 191st had been transferred to 8th Army, and it, plus the five other worn-down divisions of that Army threatened the left flank of XXXXI Panzers, forcing it to suspend its attacks on Krasnogvardeisk.[8]

Oranienbaum Bridgehead

To resolve this situation, the German 18th Army's XXVI and XXVIII Army Corps attacked northward toward the Gulf of Finland between August 22-25. By September 1, 8th Army had been forced back to new defenses in a tight bridgehead south of Oranienbaum, which would be held by Soviet forces until 1944. The assault left 8th Army in a shambles. The Army commander reported to Popov on August 25 that "[t]he main danger now in the command and control of units is the absence of almost 100 percent of our regimental commanders and their chiefs of staff and battalion commanders."[9]

Leningrad was cut off on September 8. Meanwhile, 8th Army defended the bridgehead with the 191st, 118th, 11th, and 281st Rifle Divisions, facing XXXVIII Corps. The attack began on September 9. According to A. V. Burov's war diary, "Battle is also raging south of Kolpino and along the Oranienbaum axis." The 191st was facing the 291st Infantry Division west of Ropsha. The division was pushed northwest of that place, but managed to hold there. General Zhukov had arrived at Leningrad on September 9, and his deputy, Maj. Gen. I. I. Fedyuninskii, soon reported that the morale of 8th Army, as well as the 42nd and 55th Armies, was cracking. On September 14, Zhukov decided to go over to the attack, as he perceived that the German advance to Uritsk had left them vulnerable to a flank attack; 8th Army would act as the "hammer" and 42nd Army as the "anvil". The 191st and 281st Divisions, reinforced by the 11th and 10th Rifle Divisions plus what remained of the 3rd Opolcheniye Division would attack toward Krasnoye Selo. The commander of 8th Army, Maj. Gen. V. I. Shcherbakov, declared his forces were too weak to carry out this plan, and he was relieved of his command. Lt. Gen. T. I. Shevaldin replaced him.[10]

In the event, the German forces preempted 8th Army's counterattack, by resuming their own offensive on September 16. This encountered strong and continuing Soviet resistance and heavy fighting went on for possession of Volodarsky, Uritsk, and Pulkovo Heights until the end of the month, by which time 42nd Army had solidified its defenses. However, to the west three German divisions, including 1st Panzer, attacked and defeated 10th Rifle and forced it to abandon Volodarsky on September 16. The attackers reached the Gulf of Finland the same day, cutting the Oranienbaum bridgehead off from Leningrad, which was in turn cut off from the rest of the USSR. Whipped on by Zhukov, Shevaldin completed his regrouping on September 18 and attacked toward Krasnoye Selo with four divisions the next day. A further German assault struck on September 20, forcing the 191st and the remainder of Shevaldin's shock group back to the line Novyi Petergof–Tomuzi–Petrovskaya, where the front stabilized once and for all.[11]

First Sinyavino Offensive

In early October the 191st was removed from the bridgehead into Leningrad proper, where it was assigned to the Eastern Sector Operational Group, formed by Fedyuninskii from 55th Army and Front reserves. This Group consisted of five rifle divisions, two tank brigades and one battalion, and supporting artillery. It was intended to assault across the Neva River on a 5km-wide sector between Peski and Nevskaya Dubrovka, advance toward Sinyavino, and help encircle and destroy the German forces south of Shlisselburg in conjunction with 54th Army advancing from the east, effectively lifting the siege. Again, German action preempted the Soviet attack, as they began a thrust toward Tikhvin on October 16. Nevertheless, the STAVKA insisted that the attack proceed as planned on October 20, but it made little progress. By October 23, Tikhvin was directly threatened,[12] and at about this time the 191st was transferred to 4th Army, which was under direct STAVKA control.[13]

Battle for Tikhvin

The mission of Army Group North was exploit an apparent weakness of Soviet forces along the Volkhov River, attack through Tikhvin to Lake Ladoga to cut Leningrad's last tenuous rail links to Moscow, and possibly link up with the Finnish Army on the Svir River. To conduct the offensive, the XXXIX Motorized Corps and most of I Army Corps were concentrated at Kirishi, Lyuban, and southward along the Volkhov. By mid-October the 54th, 4th, and 52nd Armies, plus Northwestern Front's Novgorod Army Group, were attempting to defend a 200km front, with 4th Army conducting local operations along a 50km line from just west of Kirishi and southward along the Volkhov. The harsh terrain in the Tikhvin region would have a major impact on the upcoming operations, a vast forested and swampy territory crisscrossed with many rivers and streams. The deteriorating weather would also play a role.[14]

Early on October 16, the German 21st and 126th Infantry Divisions had stormed across the Volkhov, followed later in the day by the 12th Panzer and 20th Motorized Divisions. 4th Army's defenses were penetrated in four days of fighting in roadless terrain covered with 10cm of snow. On October 23 Budogoshch was taken, which convinced the STAVKA that 4th Army required reinforcement. The 191st was moved by air transport to Sitomlya, some 40km southwest of Tikhvin, to take up hastily-erected defenses, while the 44th Rifle Division was airlifted to Tikhvin itself as a backstop along the Syas River. The Army was also sent the 92nd Rifle and 60th Tank Divisions from the Reserve of the Supreme High Command.[15]

Once reinforced, the 4th and 52nd Armies should have been able to drive the German forces back to the Volkhov. However, their defenses continued to collapse due to committing reserves into battle in piecemeal fashion, without preparation, and with weak command and control. As an example, on October 27 the 191st, with elements of 4th Guards Rifle Division and 60th Tanks attacked the 12th Panzer's advance guard near Sitomlya. This effort failed because it was poorly coordinated (the 191st had only arrived over the previous two days), but it did force the panzers to halt their advance and regroup. Over the coming days the STAVKA began planning a series of counterstrokes which it hoped would end in the defeat of the German forces on the Tikhvin axis. 4th Army's commander was ordered to concentrate two shock groups, each of roughly two divisions, southwest of the town. The first group consisted of the 191st, one rifle regiment of the 44th and one regiment of 60th Tanks deployed in the vicinity of Sitomlya. The two groups were to attack on November 1 toward Budogoshch and Gruzino together with the 92nd Division already operating to the south, and eventually reestablish the Soviet positions along the Volkhov. The 191st actually began its attack on November 2, but it failed in the face of heavy German air and artillery strikes and strong counterattacks.[16] In the course of this fighting, Colonel Lukyanov was seriously wounded and evacuated to the rear. After being released from hospital in January 1942 he was given command of the 2nd Rifle Division and held several other commands during the remainder of the war, being promoted to the rank of major general on May 18, 1943. Col. Pavel Semyonovich Vinogradov took over the 191st on November 5.

On the same date, and despite further counterattacks, XXXIX Motorized resumed its advance, now reinforced with 8th Panzer and 18th Motorized Divisions. 12th Panzer shoved the 191st to one side on November 6 and, aided by a frigid blast of weather that began freezing rivers and streams, captured Tikhvin on November 8, cutting the last rail line from Moscow to Lake Ladoga. Despite this success, it was clear that the German force had "shot its bolt". Its vehicles and men had been severely weakened by Soviet resistance, the exceptional cold and the terrible terrain. Even before reaching the town, temperatures had dropped as low as -40 degrees and ill-equipped German soldiers were frostbitten or simply froze to death. Tikhvin was three-quarters encircled and there was no strength or will to continue driving northward. Hitler, however, refused to sanction any retreat.[17]

The Tikhvin Counterstroke

Maximum extent of German advance, November 12

In late November the three Soviet Armies faced a total of 10 infantry divisions, two motorized and two panzer divisions deployed on a very lengthy front from Lake Ladoga to Tikhvin and then southwest to Lake Ilmen. All of these were reduced to about 60 percent strength and had a combined total of about 100 tanks and assault guns, plus about 1,000 artillery pieces. The STAVKA had concentrated 17 rifle divisions, two tank divisions, one cavalry division (also under strength to various degrees), plus other units, giving them a considerable superiority in infantry and guns, and a slight inferiority in armor. 4th Army, now under command of Army Gen. K. A. Meretskov, was divided into Northern, Eastern and Southern Operational Groups; the Eastern consisted of the 191st, one rifle regiment of the 44th Division, the 27th Cavalry Division, the 120th Regiment of 60th Tanks, plus the 128th Tank Battalion. The 191st faced 18th Motorized just south of the town; this division was trying to hold a strongpoint defense line along the long route XXXIX Corps had taken to Tikhvin. The Army's mission was to encircle the German forces in the town and destroy them, then to exploit toward Budogoshch, linking up with the two other Armies before taking bridgeheads over the Volkhov.[18]

It proved impossible to coordinate the start of such a wide-ranging offensive, and 4th Army's part began on November 19. 12th Panzer and 18th Motorized remained bottled up in Tikhvin on Hitler's orders, although the Soviet pressure on the strongpoint defense line, which had been reinforced with the 250th Infantry Division, required a constant drain on armor from the town. By December 7, the 12th Panzer and 18th Motorized were enveloped from three sides and suffering heavy losses fighting in deep snow and bitter cold. The 18th had lost 5,000 men and was reduced about 1,000 combat soldiers, on top of its losses in the advance. Meretskov's Southern Group was approaching Sitomlya, threatening communications from Tikhvin to the rear. At this time the Soviet counteroffensive west of Moscow was underway, which rendered Hitler's notions of continuing an advance from Tikhvin utterly futile. At 0200 hours on December 8 he finally authorized a withdrawal, which, in fact, had been underway for several hours. As this went on, the Northern and Eastern Groups struck the German rearguards and liberated Tikhvin late on December 9. While the mobile divisions withdrew in good order, the 61st Infantry Division's 151st Regiment, supported by two companies of 18th Motorized's 51st Regiment, attempted to block the pursuit and suffered catastrophic losses in the process.[19] The retaking of Tikhvin, in the event, would prove to be one of the first permanent liberations of Soviet territory during the war, and probably saved Leningrad. On December 17, the 191st would become one of the Red Army's first rifle divisions to be awarded the Order of the Red Banner for WWII service.[20]

Lyuban Offensive

Lyuban Offensive

By this time the forces of Army Group North was falling back to new defenses being erected along the Volkhov. Effective December 17 the STAVKA formed the new Volkhov Front, consisting of the 4th, 52nd, 59th and 26th (soon redesignated 2nd Shock) Armies. At 2000 hours a directive was issued which stated:

The Volkhov Front... will launch a general offensive to smash the enemy defending along the western bank of the Volkhov River and reach the Liuban' and Cholovo Station front with your armies, main forces by the end of [left blank]...
Subsequently, attacking to the northwest, encircle the enemy defending around Leningrad, destroy and capture him in cooperation with the Leningrad Front.[21]

The 191st would essentially remain in this Front until January 1944. On December 21, Colonel Vinogradov left the division to become chief of staff of 4th Army; he was replaced the next day by Maj. Gen. Timofei Vasilevich Lebedev. This officer had been commandant of the Moscow Infantry School in 1940-41, before taking command of the 235th Rifle Division prior to the war.

Expanding the Tikhvin counteroffensive into a Volkhov-Leningrad offensive of much greater scope first required the establishment of adequate bridgeheads. To Stalin's disgust, the armies of Volkhov Front (under command of Meretskov) did so too slowly. 4th Army reached the river near Kirishi and Gruzino on December 27 and seized lodgements, but only against determined resistance. Despite Stalin's urgings, 4th Army, now under Maj. Gen. P. A. Ivanov, was not able to capture Tigoda Station. Utterly exhausted, Meretskov's forces had no choice but to go over to the defense.[22]

In January 1942 the 191st was transferred to 2nd Shock Army.[23] In the buildup to the renewed offensive the Army was ordered to form several operational groups in order to improve command and control over its greatly increased forces. The division was allocated to Operational Group Privalov, along with the 382nd Rifle Division and the 57th Ski Brigade. Its mission was to move the 191st and the 57th "through a penetration in the Lesopunkt region on the night of January 27 and advance through Olkhovka and Krevino to the Malaya Brontitsa, Chervino, and Ruchi regions as rapidly as possible."[24] On January 26, as he was leading elements of the division in a preliminary operation, General Lebedev was killed when his vehicle was blown up by an antitank mine. At the time, he was also serving as deputy chief of staff to 4th Army.[25] He was buried at Malaya Vishera, and was replaced the next day by Col. Aleksandr Ivanovich Starunin. This officer had previously served as chief of staff of the 311th Rifle Division before taking the same role in the 191st.

References

Citations

  1. ↑ Charles C. Sharp, "Red Legions", Soviet Rifle Divisions Formed Before June 1941, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, Vol. VIII, Nafziger, 1996, p. 92. This source misnumbers the 552nd Rifle and 484th Artillery Regiments.
  2. ↑ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, p. 7
  3. ↑ Sharp, "Red Legions", p. 93
  4. ↑ David M. Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2002, pp. 18-20
  5. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944, pp. 37-39
  6. ↑ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, p. 22
  7. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944, pp. 39, 41-42
  8. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944, pp. 46-47, 51, 53, 60-61
  9. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944, p. 61
  10. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944, pp. 70-73, 75, 77-78
  11. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944, pp. 78-80
  12. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944, pp. 92-94
  13. ↑ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, p. 65
  14. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944, pp. 94-96
  15. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944, pp. 96-97
  16. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944, pp. 97-100
  17. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944, pp. 100-01
  18. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944, pp. 104-05
  19. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944, pp. 106-09
  20. ↑ Affairs Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union 1967a, p. 104.
  21. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944, pp. 109-111
  22. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944, p. 112
  23. ↑ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1942, p. 25
  24. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944, pp. 165-66
  25. ↑ Aleksander A. Maslov, Fallen Soviet Generals, ed. & trans. D. M. Glantz, Frank Cass Publishers, London, UK, 1998, pp. 39, 211

Bibliography

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